information is abstracted from the declassified Historical Reports of the 3084th
Aviation Depot Group from 1 Jan 1956 to 31 Dec 1959.)
3084th OPERATIONS SQUADRON (3097th AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON) - OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES
(1 Jan - 30 June 1956)
As the mission of the Directorate of Operations was to perform special weapons activities for the Group one of its functions was to schedule operations to execute both locally directed exercises and those received from higher headquarters.
These operations, which were held periodically during the past historical period, were special weapons exercises directed by Headquarters AMC or the Commander, 3079th ADW (AMC). Maximum individual training was accomplished by the personnel concerned in the following procedures: breakout, assembly, dispersal, convoy to the WCP, simulated transfer procedures, WCP operations, convoy to the Q-Area and storage.
VIEW (all Adobe PDF documents)
OPS Order 1-56 OPS Order 2-56 OPS Order 3-56 OPS Order 5-56
No events of historical importance occurred during these special weapons exercises other than the personnel training mentioned above. The operations listed below however, together with inspections, reports and other activities, are those events which are considered of historical value. They are treated below in chronological orders, as they affect Operations Squadron.
The Operations Control Center was activated in the War Room of Headquarters Building on 3 January 1956. This soundproof room, complete with telephones, radio and intercom facilities, was used as the control center during all operational exercises. Progress control status boards were mounted on the wall to enable control center personnel to better monitor and record the operations. This new arrangement proved very satisfactory during the operations described below. Photographs on the following pages depict the control center and its facilities. (View photos in Adobe PDF file.)
(Ed. Note: The following === characters have been added to separate the exercises performed by the Operations Squadron.)
An execution order for a "Last Chance" operation was received at 2010Z on 22 Jan 56. The recall plan was put into effect and sufficient personnel were present by 2050Z to initiate the operation.
The execution order specified the assembly of weapons to CAS configuration and delivery to the WCP in accordance with AMC OPlan 8-56. Thermonuclear weapons were to be delivered first, and atomic weapons were then delivered as substitutes for subsequent TN weapons committed on the site schedule. However, six hours were added to all the loading schedules, which in effect added six hours to the WCP delivery schedule as outlined in AMC OPlan 8-56.
Within Operations Squadron, primary operators and newly assigned personnel were utilized in job manning whenever feasible. Only three Type I training weapons were available at the beginning of the exercise, as one had been loaned to the 4050th Munitions Branch (SAC) for aircraft loading training. Handling Division picked up this weapon from the munitions branch, and it was subsequently utilized for the fourth Type I assembly. No major difficulties were experienced in completing the required assemblies.
A problem of a long delay was encountered between assembly and convoy times, due to six hours being added to the loading schedules. This added time resulted in an eleven hour delay at this station between completion of the last assembly and the start of the first convoy. Since the 308th was the only ADG which had a late delivery commitment it was recommended that this site be relived of such added loading schedule times in future operations in order to eliminate the long delay incurred in this exercise. It was further recommended that if added time be directed for loading schedules in future "Last Chance" operations that this site be authorized to decrease its loading schedule by an equal amount of time. This would enable the assembly and convoy operations to be conducted similar to those at other sites and under more rigid time requirements.
Operation "Soft Shoe" was conducted during the period 27-30 Jan 56 and this station was required to furnish the necessary support as outlined in AMC Ops O 115-56. Accordingly, the Operations Control Center was set up as the coordinating agency for outgoing and incoming communications concerning the operation.
Personnel were on duty at the control center on a 24 hour basis for the duration of the operation. In addition, Nuclear Division furnished personnel to act as Salvage Appraisal Officers at WAFB Base Operations three hours prior to the arrival of mission aircraft, and again during take-off and for three hours thereafter. This station also furnished AMC movement coordinators at WAFB. Information and communications pertaining to "Soft Shoe" were routed through these site agencies. No major difficulties were encountered during this operation.
The 3084th ADG supported a join AMC-SAC special weapons training exercise on 13-17 Feb 56, in support of SAC Ops O 19-56 and AMC Ops O 117-56, unclassified nickname "Squeeze Play". Local Ops O 3-56 and Annex A thereto directed the 3084th ADG to participate in the exercise which paralleled portions of AMC and SAC EWPs, constituting special weapons support of SAC aircraft of the 72nd Bomb Wing (M). (View Adobe PDF of Ops O 3-56)
(Ed. Note: DOE redacted about 5 lines from the report at this point.)
...................... area after the loading, and were then returned to storage. One MK17 training weapon was borrowed from the 4050th Munitions Branch (SAC) WAFB for the duration of the exercise.
The exercise commenced at 1300Z on 14 Feb at which time breakout of components from storage was started and power supplies were placed on charge in Assembly Division II.
(Ed. Note: DOE redacted about 5 line from the report at this point.)
Mission aircraft arrival times were scheduled to closely approximate actual EWP times, and convoy times to the WCP were scheduled accordingly. Due to the non-availability of newly arrived equipment only three straddle carriers were utilized. One of these was used exclusively for movement of weapons between the WCP and the aircraft loading pads, and the other two straddle carriers were used for convoy operations. No difficulties were encountered in meeting the commitments of the exercise.
The overall results obtained from this operation were most satisfactory. It was believed that both WAFB and SB personnel greatly benefited by this exercise. The Staff Munitions Officer, 4050th ABG (SAC) agreed to participate in all "Last Chance" exercises, and also in this station's monthly locally prepared training exercises.
Capt Charles C. Briggs Jr. from 3079th ADW (AMC) Scheduling Office visited the station on 5-7 March 1956 to inspect the scheduling procedures and to discuss the revised Wing Regulation 82-1. He also determined the status of military-maintained stockpile records.
In the report of this visit, Capt Briggs found that there were no deficiencies in the scheduling procedures. He also stated that the stockpile records maintained by the Scheduling Section indicated exact present status, history for a period in excess of two years and necessary cross-references between major components.
As a result of this visit, the 3084th ADG was able to prepare for scheduling and reporting changes which were required by the revised Wing Reg 82-1. No action was necessary by the 3079th ADW (AMC) as all problems were found to be local in nature and remedial action was taken by site personnel.
An exercise on Annex Alpha of Operation "Set Screw" was called at 0837Z on 7 Mar 56. The Officer of the Day initiated the alert recall communications check and personnel of the affected sections were individually notified, but were not required to report to the station. The exercise was completed by 1022Z. No difficulties were encountered.
Col R. P. Stimpson and Lt Col W. H. Edwards from HQ USAF, AFOOP, visited the station on 16 Mar 56 for a special weapons orientation. They were briefed on the organizational and operational set-up of the Control Center and the two Assembly Divisions. They were also briefed in communications and operating procedures of these sections. They were highly pleased with the methods, procedures and organization employed at this station.
A local "Last Chance" operation was called by the Group Commander at 0200Z 4 May. The operation was initiated by recall without prior warning to the personnel. The Operations Control Center was manned by 0230Z and assembly of four Type I and two Type II training units to CAS configuration was initiated at 0235Z. One convoy run was made to Hardstand No. 10 at WAFB. Simulated communications (TWXs and phone calls) were accomplished for training purposes, and a message was sent to 3079th ADW (AMC) notifying them of the operation. The exercise was terminated at 0545Z 4 May with no major difficulties encountered.
A "Last Chance" exercise was called by AMC at 0255Z 8 May 56. (Ed. Note: about 4-5 lines redacted here by DOE.) ....................................... For test purposes all commercial type telephones, both military and civilian, on the base and in the local area were considered inoperative.
Accordingly, no telephones were used on matters concerning the operation. The recall was implemented at 0320Z 8 May, and alert drivers were utilized on notifying key personnel who, in turn, contacted their personnel. No undue delay in recall was encountered and sufficient personnel reported to accomplish the tasks at hand by 0533Z. During the exercise the guard radio net, production control radio net, intercom and field phones replaced the theoretically inoperative telephone systems.
The first batteries were placed on charge at 0430Z 8 May and the assembly of both types of weapons to CAS configuration commenced as soon as possible therefter. As the execution order specified, Plant I M-Bay was considered demolished, the mechanical assembly functions were carried out in the MHE building. No difficulties were encountered in the actual assembly procedures with average assembly times per weapons of 0:25 for Type I and 1:09 for Type II. The last weapon was delivered to the WCP at 1620Z 8 May. (Ed. Note: Not sure if this time is a typo mistake. Surely it would not have required around 12 hours, from 0430Z to 1620Z!)
Augmentation personnel were utilized extensively during this operation. Handling Division assisted the AEC Custodian in breakout, while personnel from Headquarters, Support and Security not otherwise occupied with operational duties augmented Handling Division personnel.
The one delay which occurred during this exercise was the delay in breakout of Type II weapons. This was mainly attributable to a misunderstanding at the time of the execution of the exercise between the AEC Custodian and the military as to when the plant would be ready to accept weapons. The lack of normal communications was the main factor in this misunderstanding. To preclude a recurrence of this type of delay additional emergency type telephone communication lines have been installed between the AEC offices and Operations Control Center. In addition, the AEC Custodian and the Site Commander have reached a firm agreement on set procedures to be followed by the AEC, to provide initial weapons as soon as possible without the Custodian waiting for further instructions from the Control Center.
A Management Improvement Review of the 3084th ADG was conducted 14-16 May 56. Within the Directorate of Operations during this review, emphasis was placed on management procedures having a bearing on the operational and training capability of the organization. EWP plans, the MK15/21 report and training of augmentation personnel were examined for workability and compatibility. No deficiencies were found that would limit the capability at this station.
The review board checked the recall and war plans and found that all war plans were maintained properly and were realistic. They stated, "The 3084th should be commended for the fine job accomplished on the war room. It is beyond a doubt, one of the best of its kind." The review board further recommended that the 3079th ADW make the ideas on the war room and its contents available to the other sites for possible utilization.
The review board also checked the maintenance of training record cards. Lt Bussert, Operations Squadron Training Officer, had spent considerable time and effort on improving these training record cards in order that the information on them would be more readily available to the various supervisors. The review team complimented Lt Bussert for his efforts and said, --
It is quite evident that he has put forth a great deal of thought and effort in
devising a card which
is highly satisfactory toward a management and information standpoint. This card was discussed
at some length with Lt Bussert and the method by which the card is to be maintained is quite good.
The review team recommended that a suitable letter of explanation with a copy of the proposed form be submitted to Headquarters, 3079th ADW for evaluation. This recommendation was carried out and the letter was submitted.
The previous IG inspection report was reviewed and it was determined that the deficiencies noted therein had been corrected and that all necessary plans and SOPs had been accomplished as recommended by the IG inspector. The review team recommended that supervisory personnel review previous inspection reports to make certain that these deficiencies were not being overlooked during daily work and training operations. Supervisory personnel were directed to comply with this recommendation and appropriate follow-up action was taken by staff personnel to insure compliance.
Comments by the review team on the MK15/21 igloo concept, the training of augmentation personnel and the delivery of weapons are contained in the following chapters of Handling Division and Assembly Type II Division histories.
The 3084th ADG supported a joint AMC-SAC transfer of special weapons during the period 19-26 June 56, as directed by Annex G to AMC OPORD 112-56, unclassified nickname "Big Talk". (ED. Note: DOE redacted about 1 or 2 sentences here.) ....................................................The assembled weapons were transported to the WCP in accordance with the schedule listed in the Ops Order. The Operations Control Center was activated and Operations personnel monitored the operation. No difficulties were encountered and mission aircraft departed in accordance with the SAC-adjusted schedule. (Ed. Note: DOE redacted by about 6 lines at this point.) ........................................................................................................................................................................ These projects in the assembly plants were in addition to the normal monthly workload which was accomplished in accordance with AMC and 3079th Wing requirements. Full details on both projects and the number of weapon assemblies are contained in the respective division histories.
(1 July - 31 December 1956)
Download Adobe PDF - Operations Squadron - Organization and Personnel
Download Adobe PDF - Operations Squadron - Operational Activities (1MB FILE)
(1 Jan - 30 June 1957)
At the outset of this reporting period, the number of missions involving other agencies arriving at this station for pickup or delivery of weapons and components was comparatively small. However, during the last six months, this organization participated in a large number of such missions. The rapid transition that had to be made from the rather quiet situation, where most of the shipments to and from this Station had been by rail, to one where numbers of aircraft and large crews needed assistance, was at times difficult. Naturally problems arose which had not been anticipated. However, as has happened innumerable times in the past, a system gradually evolved which was capable of the flexibility that was mandatory in meeting these commitments.
On 8 January 57, the first operation of the reporting period, named OPERATION RED HOUSE, was begun. The mission of the 3097th ADS was to provide nuclear weapons and components for deployment by SAC. ............. (1-2 sentences redacted by DOE.) ...................................... Support received from the other units at this Station was exceptionally good during this operation. Schedules were met and all activities concerned worked well together. There were, of course, minor problems which arose, primarily with the coordination of Station activities with those of SAC. However, the operation was completed with a minimum number of delays. As so often happened during this time of year, there were delays because of inclement weather; as a result, the operation was completed one day behind schedule.
The next operation with which this organization was concerned was REAR DOOR. This operation was similar to RED HOUSE except that it involved AMC Logistical Support Squadrons (LSS) and involved the movement of weapons and components overseas. Stony Brook was directly concerned with only two of the total number of deliveries called for in the Operations Plan, and then was charged with the support of any of the mission aircraft which stopped at this Station prior to clearing for overseas.
The support of the missions listed above, and the ones to follow, was a matter deserving attention. A tremendous amount of detail involved operations concerning three organizations, such as the LSS's, SAC, and AMC. Stony Brook, and more particularly, the 3097th ADS, was directly concerned in every movement to and from this Station. At least three hours, and in most instances six hours in advance of any movement, exercise, or test, the Operations Control Center was manned on a full time basis. Operations Controllers provided the necessary coordination between various participating organizations within Stony Brook, and were also a central agency for coordination and communication with SAC, as well as Wing Headquarters. It was in the Control Center that the various commanders could receive vital intelligence necessary to their operations. It was also from here that the actions of the Movement Coordinator were controlled. The Movement Coordinator provided the vital link between arriving aircraft and their Commanders and crews needs and desires. Also provided at all times was the transportation necessary to meet the schedules specified by the Operations Plan.
On 14 January 57, preparations were formally initiated for the Management Review (MIR) which began on 28 January 57. As was stated in Wing Regulation 25-1, the MIR was primarily established to determine the operational effectiveness of the organization. Also planned in conjunction with the MIR was a shakedown inspection in Plant II on the MK 39 MOD O. Of particular importance to the 3097th ADS were training records and check lists. All units within this organization participated in the review.
The MIR Team was under the Command of Colonel Raymond A. Bradley, Deputy Commander of the 3079th Aviation Depot Wing, and the inspectors concerned with the shakedown on the MK 39 MOD 0 were Major Johnson and Captain Hall, of the same organization.
The team's general evaluation said in part: .....The 3084th Operations Squadron is well organized, manned with qualified personnel, and is capable of meeting any war time commitment which normally would be placed upon an organization of this type. The formulated plans and procedures, if effectively implemented, should enable the Squadron to cope with any contingency. A high degree of cooperation exists between the staff and personnel at the working level. Squadron morale is excellent......
There were, however, several areas which the MIR team felt required additional planning and corrective action. The most important of these was in the area of technical order reading and familiarization. In the case of the above discrepancy, and others mentioned in the report, steps were taken immediately to remedy and correct deficiencies.
The MK 39 MOD 0 shakedown inspection by Major Johnson was on the whole successful. The general difficulties encountered could not be corrected at this Station. Several testers which had been back-ordered were not available, and as a result some of the procedures in the MK 39 Storage Inspection Test had to be omitted. However, the Inspection Team was satisfied that the plant personnel were familiar with the testers and were able to read the schematics and explain the theory of operation.
In conjunction with the MIR visit, a LAST CHANCE exercise was initiated by Wing Headquarters on 29 January 57. Throughout the entire exercise, specific and general phases were monitored and inspected by the team members, in particular, by Colonel Bradley. Unlike most LAST CHANGE operations, this exercise was initiated by person to person contact, simulating a communications failure. The difficulties of notifying personnel were, of course magnified. However, in spite of the problems involved, all units became operational within one hour and thirteen minutes after initial notification. Other problems encountered during the exercise were: a simulated power failure in Plants I and II; battery failure (actual) on one 6 x 6 vehicle; and a simulated flat tire on a convoy vehicle at "Q" gate.
The fact that these problems were for the most part deliberately contrived in no way detracted from the obvious points that could be learned from the exercise. The work that had to be done was accomplished efficiently. In a critique held later, it was determined that there were many areas of planning that needed attention.
Following the critique, all sections immediately set to work to rectify problems which, had they been real, would have seriously hampered operations, even more than they did during the simulated phase of the exercise.
After a general discussion held by Colonel Bradley concerning the Review, the MIR was considered ended, and the team members departed.
Operation BOOT HEEL which began 17 February 57 was an AMC directed operation involving extensive use of C-124 aircraft of the LSS. The operation consisted of movement of weapons and components to overseas sites, and in turn bringing units from the overseas sites to this Station. An interesting facet to this operation was that Wing Headquarters authorized the inclusion of Station flying personnel on this mission as crew members. A total of three pilots from this organization flew on Operation BOOT HEEL.
Originally scheduled to begin on 15 February 57, because of weather delays, the first mission aircraft departed this Station on 17 February 57. Throughout the remainder of February, and up to 3 April 57, BOOT HEEL continued as an active plan for this Station. Predominant among causes of delays was weather, either here or at destination. There were also several maintenance delays which held up the schedule. The cooperation of the personnel at Westover Base Operations was excellent. Aircraft refueling, line maintenance, and Base Operations facilities were at all tines made available to the mission aircraft and their crews. In addition, during all loading and off loading operations, the Westover fire and crash crews stood by in complete readiness. A very favorable comparison of the facilities of this Station and Westover, against similar facilities at other bases, was made by Station pilots flying as crew members on mission aircraft. By far the most extensive service afforded the mission aircraft and crews was at this site.
The first operation of the reporting period in which SAC and AMC training units were mutually used for loading and transfer training occurred on 26 February 57, with the initiation of Operation BABY SHOES. ...............(1-2 sentences redacted by DOE.)................... BABY SHOES marked the beginning of the operations linking this organization closer and closer to the SAC mission.
(NOTE: This is a list of the operations as reported on a Footnotes page in the historical report.)
Joint Operation, Stony Brook AFS/Westover AFB, 7 June 1957
FAST TROT, 26 June 1957
In all, the 3097th Aviation Depot Squadron supported Westover AFB in eight exercises during the reporting period. Some of the exercises were supported by operations orders from the 99th Bomb Wing (SAC); others merely by local operations schedules supplied and made up by 3097th ADS Operations Plans Section.
Because of the great number of loadings to which the Stony Brook and SAC training units were subjected, the condition of the trainers rapidly deteriorated in a short period of time. In order to reach an understanding concerning the responsibility for maintaining those training units belonging to Westover AFB, a Maintenance Agreement was drawn up and approved on 15 April 57. Under the terms of this agreement, Stony Brook AFS assumed the responsibility for maintaining Westover AFB training units. Damage incurred during operations at Westover AFB, whether to AMC or SAC units, was chargeable to the 24th ADS, Westover AFB, if the item involved was of a local purchase nature. Major items were supplied in accordance with AFM 67-1.
Toward the end of the reporting period for 1956, this Station, and more particularly the 3097th ADS, was assigned the responsibility for supporting the W-25 program at Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan. This added responsibility meant a new operational phase was unfolding. In addition to normal maintenance and storage facilities at this Station, the 3097th ADS was also assigned responsibility for special weapons operations at another base. To this end, Plant I trained both officers and enlisted men in the inspection and acceptance procedures of the W-25. When this had been accomplished, teams were established and the support of this mission continued throughout the period of this report.
Many extended periods of TDY were accomplished by Plant I personnel in support of this program and to date, support activities have been successful to a large degree. Notable was the cooperation and support that Stony Brook personnel received from their counterparts at Wurtsmith AFB. .................. (5 lines redacted by DOE.) ..............................
On 26 March 1957, a LAST CHANCE exercise was ordered by 3079th Aviation Depot Wing. Although still on a four and twelve hour alert recall plan, all divisions were operational within one hour after recall. All available MK 6, MK 15, and MK 17 training units at this Station were assembled to CAS, delivered and transferred to SAC at the Weapon Control Point. Units were then returned to the igloos and the operation was completed by 0300 local on 27 March 57.
.....................(7 lines redacted by DOE.) ............................................ Weapons which had been stored in various parts of the world with varying climatic conditions were shipped during this operation, as well as in BOOT HEEL, and were included in this study. LIFE GUARD was conducted using SAC aircraft with this Station supplying necessary loading and handling crews, as well as Salvage and Appraisal Officers. The mission was completed on 22 April 57.
In conjunction with, but not a part of LIFE GUARD, operation TRAP FROG was concerned with the return of special weapons to the ZI from various stations throughout the world. This operation also was devoted to the climatology study of the effects of weather on special weapons. This mission, however, was conducted by LSS aircraft and received direct support from this Station. The Operations Control Center was activated at all times during the operation. Movement coordinators, as well as Salvage and Appraisal Officers, were available at all times. LEAP FROG began 15 May 57 and was completed on 22 May 57. ............ (One sentence redacted by DOE.).........................
Two LAST CHANCE exercises were held during the month of May; one on 17 May and one on 22 May. On the 17th, the recall was initiated at 0400 local with all sections participating. This exercise afforded excellent time data for future planning purposes. All committed delivery times were met.
On 22 May a LAST CHANCE combined with simulated SIX GUN exercise was begun at 0500 local time. The Station was operational at 0545 hours. During this operation, all sections participated and the assembly and delivery of 33 units were simulated for reporting purposes.
Two developments which evolved as a result of the MIR team inspection in January were the establishment of an alternate control room in Plant I, and more complete and detailed control of the salvage and appraisal system.
Special Weapons Operating Procedure 11-4, dated 1 May 1957, established the location and circumstances under which the alternate control room, located in the supervisor's office of Plant I, will be activated. Procedures were established for transporting necessary control documents as well as pertinent plans from the Control Center in Group Headquarters to the alternate Control Room. At Plant I, all necessary radio and telephone aids will be in readiness, and file copies of Emergency War Plans and control documents will be available for immediate use.
One problem area which was difficult to alleviate was that of Appraisal and Recovery (A & S). Due to the fact that SAC, as well as AMC, transports special weapons by air, the problem of responsibility was acute. Under the guidance of Captain Sevigny, who was appointed Chief Appraisal and Recovery Officer, a roster of eligible officers was compiled and briefings and schooling on A & S procedures were conducted. A recovery kit was assembled and a vehicle made available to the A & S Officer on duty. In addition, procedures outlining Westover's responsibilities in supplying crash and fire equipment as well as guards were formalized. The problem which still remained at the end of this reporting period was that of areas of responsibility. It was anticipated that by 1 July 1957 a new regulation covering all aspects of salvage and recovery would be forthcoming from Headquarters AMC.
The one major change in organizational structure within the Squadron during this reporting period was the creation of the Assembly Division. For some time prior to the establishment of the Assembly Division, lines of communication between Squadron Headquarters and the Plants were difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. Because of the nature of the mission of the Assembly Division, work priorities and schedules were continually changing and it was difficult to keep the supervisors fully acquainted with operational commitments. And, because of the continued time problem that faces every Commander, it was occasionally just as difficult for the supervisors to present their problems to the Commander. Because of this problem, the office of Assembly Division was created. As can be seen by the appended organizational chart, the Assembly Division was placed on an equal level with the other divisions within the Squadron. Squadron policies and plans were then disseminated down through the Assembly Division to the plants with a resultant greater control and coordination. Captain Homer H. Ozenghar was assigned as the Chief, Assembly Division, and as such continued throughout the remainder of the reporting period. The Assembly Division was established on 1 February 1957, but it was not until April 1957 that an office was established which was to become the center of activities for both Plant I and Plant II.
One of the most important items of progress that this history can document was completed at the end of June 1957. Some months prior to this date, this Station received Wing Operations Plan 1-57, concerning evacuation plans. In formulating local Operations Plan 1-57, Lt. Gerald B. Connor, Plans Officer, contacted Mr. Robert Boulay, the area Civil Defense Coordinator. This meeting proved to be most beneficial to both parties concerned. For, prior to this time, there had been no contact made by an military organization with the Civil Defense organization in this area. Mr. Boulay was highly pleased with the plans as formulated by Lt. Connor, and gave every assistance that his office could offer. Through these two men, evacuation routes were established, emergency approval was granted for irregular means of access to the Massachusetts Turnpike, and priorities were established.
Stony Brook was the first military body to contact and work through the Civil Defense organization, both in this local area, as well as adjacent areas. All plans which included the support of the Civil Defense have been approved and made firm. A system had been established by Civil Defense Headquarters whereby approval for various routes used by different organizations could be coordinated by higher Headquarters. The Plans Section, acting for Stony Brook, was the first agency requesting established routes and therefore afforded the Civil Defense Area Administrator his first opportunity to utilize his integrated coordination system. The success of this system and its application to Stony Brook needs, greatly assisted the Civil Defense efforts in this area. Operations Plan 1-57 covering Station Evacuation will be published on 1 July 1957.
(1 July - 31 December 1957)
Operationally, the past six months have been the most active in the squadron's history, having participated in 26 assorted operations and exercises as compared to 8 during the previous 6 months. This period saw an increase in the number of readiness exercises conducted with SAC.
.................................. (10 lines redacted by DOE) ...........................................
July opened this period with five (5) operations and an AMC/AFSWP IG inspection.
................................... (5 lines redacted by DOE)
Part of this shipment was unique and presented minor problems since it was the first logistical shipment aboard tactical aircraft made by this organization. Problems were encountered since the weapons were prepared in neither CAF or CAS but a modified condition between these two configurations. This required close coordination between assembly crews end SAC loading crews. Difficulty was also experienced in obtaining the proper courier clearance certificates to satisfy AFC requirements. It was only through the concerted efforts of the Operations and Plans Division, the Special Weapons Coordinator at 8th Air Force, and the full cooperation of the Stony Brook AEC Site Manager, that all shipments left on schedule. In some cases certificates did not arrive until after loading time.
From 12 to 19 July this station took part in the National Readiness exercise "Operation Alert 1957". As pert of this exercise we supported SAC's "War Dance", with a local "Last Chance".
.................................... (5 lines redacted by DOE) .......................................
This proved to be a desirable alternate method of transportation.
At the same time "Round Up", AMC Operations Plan 4-57 was simulated. Logistical Support Squadrons sent enroute support messages end simulated loads were prepared at this station.
Although "Last Chance" and "Round Up" were terminated on the 13th of July, "Operation Alert 1957" continued through the 19th of July and required the daily submission of Stockpile Change Reports and Disaster Recovery Reports. The control room was kept operational 24 hours per day through this entire period by the Operations and Plans Division.
Right on the heels of "Operation Alert 1957" came the Annual AMC General Inspection and AFSWP Capabilities and Standardization Inspection. The inspection team from the IG, 3079th Aviation Depot Wing was supervised by Lt Col Haywood Hall, USAF. This inspection was conducted concurrently with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Technical Standardization Inspection performed by the AFSWP team led by Commander Norman N. Lemote, USN.
................................. (5 lines redacted by DOE) ........................................
In addition the operation of the War Room was observed and Emergency War Plans and SOPs were reviewed. The special weapons inspection revealed only minor deficiencies with an overall rating of Satisfactory. The Operations and Plans Division personnel were considered well qualified and organized in an efficient manner. The overall squadron rating, based on a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating, was Satisfactory with the comment that "the unit is fully capable of meeting its operational commitments in accordance with current War Plans.
Hardly had the inspectors left when "Night Latch", another logistical shipment of special weapons began.
............................... (4 lines redacted by DOE) ..................................................
On their return trips other weapon assemblies were delivered to SBAFS for inclusion in our stockpile.
On 24 July at 1421Z the Operations Section received a "Hickory Tree" message from the 99th Bomb Wing Control Room and at 1423Z it was passed to the Site Manager. At 1429Z the release certificate was given the Site Manager and he simulated transfer of the stockpile at 1430Z. This was a "no notice" test of emergency procedures for the release of Atomic end Thermonuclear War Reserve weapons in AEC custody. The results of the test were very satisfactory. On 7 November another communications check similar to this was received. This was "Box Wood". It too arrived during normal duty hours and was handled in a matter of minutes.
On 26 July AMC Operations Order 122-57 "Bad Man" which involved the shipment of capsules was complied with. This was a one sortie shipment of capsules and presented no problem.
For 5 days, beginning 5 August, the Operations Control Room participated in "Fog Count". This was a check of the operation of coordination mechanisms and weapons reporting systems on a global basis. A fictitious stockpile of fictitious weapon types was used. A simulated assembly and delivery of EWP committed and reserve weapons was made and reported as per AMC Operations Plan 8-58 and AMC Manual 82-1. The Operations Control Room was the only section involved and was operational 24 hours per day throughout the time of the operation. Except for the delay in receiving messages, no problems were noted.
"Tight Rein" was another SAC exercise that was supported by Stony Brook AFS. As with previous SAC exercises, we had a pre-determined "P" hour which usually was at the start of the work day. ............................ (3 lines redacted by DOE) ....................................................
Except for minor coordination problems with 24th ADS (SAC) no problems were experienced. ......................... (2 lines redacted by DOE) .........................
These were dispersed to SAC storage facilities.
................................. (7 lines redacted by DOE)............................... Using this system, the increased number of bases scheduled to receive the warhead would draw an even larger number of persons from this organization until it would no longer be able to perform it's EWP commitment during certain periods of time under the present UMD. Higher headquarters, realizing this, decided to put into operation the already written AMC Operation Plan 6-57, nickname "Soap Box". .......................... (4 lines redacted by DOE) ............................................. the units could be inspected and accepted for the DOD and then further airlifted to other DOD bases.
The first of these "Soap Box" missions occurred between 11 and 14 September............. (3 lines redacted by DOE) .................Three more "Soap Box" missions dispersing units from Westover AFB occurred in November and December with a fifth one in progress at the close of the reporting period. ............. (1 sentence redacted by DOE) ..................... Except for delays due to weather, no operational problems were encountered.
During the early morning hours of 13 Sep 57 SAC went into readiness condition 30-001. Upon notification we assumed the same condition. It required the short alert shift to go on immediate telephone alert in quarters. This was later modified to place the short shift, on one hour recall. This "condition" still exists although on 2 Oct 57 AMC Headquarters changed the alert requirement of "condition one" from one hour back to 4 hour alert for the short shift. The long alert shift remained on 12 hour alert during the entire period.
On 21 September SAC held a "graduation" exercise for the 99th Bombardment Wing to test its combat readiness. ........ (3 lines redacted by DOE) ....... One was due to the inexperience of SAC loading crews. The other was due to materiel failure. This was the first legitimate reject experienced by the 3097th since they began delivery to the 99th Bomb Wing. ................... (1 sentence redacted by DOE)................................... This was thoroughly investigated later, by a special Sandia Corporation team from Albuquerque, N. M. as to the cause of the failure.
Due to a shortage of SAC vehicles, we also delivered all capsules direct to the aircraft on SAC's request, instead of just to the Weapons Control Point as per normal procedures. SAC forces further requested the use of two 6x6 2 1/2 ton trucks for this exercise which were furnished. There was a great deal of experience gained by both sides (local AMC and SAC units) from the exercise. Minor areas requiring improvement showed up from time to time. These have been corrected. Control coordination between Stony Brook, 24th ADS and 99th Bomb Wing Control Rooms was exercised to the fullest extent, and much experience was gained.
.................. (1 sentence redacted by DOE) ......................... This particular movement was carried out by C-124 aircraft and did not require loading support from the 3097th ADS.
Between 26 Sep and 30 Oct the 3084th was called upon to support it's first operations order requiring coordination and administrative support only. This was "Shoe Lace". It required the 3084th ADG to supply a Movement Coordinator in accordance with AMC Manual 82-1, messing, and quarters for the air crews when they RON. It was the beginning of a series of 5 such missions during this reporting period. While the requirement per individual aircraft was small, the volume in which they traveled through Westover AFB put a large drain on personnel in the succeeding months. With the start of "Shoe Lace" through the end of this reporting period, approximately 134 aircraft on this type mission were processed through Westover AFB by Stony Brook personnel. This does not include aircraft which loaded or off loaded here during this period. Each aircraft had approximately 12 crew members to be housed, fed and transported between SBAFS and Westover flight line. Not only did these aircraft tax the resources of Stony Brook but also those of Westover. Flight line facilities were over-burdened. Hot cargo aircraft could not always be given the required isolated parking. At times parking regulations were broken in that aircraft had to be "stacked" requiring the moving of one or more aircraft before others could be moved out. Aircraft took on a fuel load averaging about 45,000 pounds each. At times refueling was delayed 2 to 4 hours. Area (point) guards were also required from Westover Security on practically all aircraft due to the classified cargo they carried. All these things tended to irritate both aircraft commanders and Westover personnel. This in turn added another requirement on Stony Brook. Many hours were consumed by staff personnel acting as mediators trying to solve these problems in order to maintain harmonious relations between LSS personnel and Westover operations. Other movements of this type were "Gang Way", "Gate Post", "Jay Bird" and AMC/3079th ADW directive 57-290.
During the first part of October the Commander, 8th Air Force requested a loan of four training weapons from the Commander AMC for a period of 30 days. The task of fulfilling this request was passed, by AMC headquarters, to 3084th ADG. On 15 October the 3097th ADS prepared and shipped to Pease AFB (SAC) one Mk 15, 2 each MK 21 and one MK 39 Mod 0 trainers leaving this squadron without any thermonuclear training weapons. After the 30 days had elapsed several requests for their return were made before they arrived back at Stony Brook on 10 Dec 57.
"Free Beer" on 15 Oct was the last weapon shipment of the year. .................. (1 sentence redacted by DOE) ............. Courier problems were again encountered. Although necessary information was available at Westover as early as 9 October it was not passed to the AEC manager at Stony Brook, as the message advised, until loading times were being jeopardized on 15 Oct. The other problem encountered when SAC SSS [Ed.: uncertain of this abbreviation] aircraft are involved in movement of weapons furnished by Stony Brook is that SAC aircraft cannot be identified until they are on the ground and the pilot confirms his mission. This delays delivery of load to aircraft when time is of the essence to maintain minimum ground time for the aircraft.
AMC message MCW3 16496, 8 Nov 57, directed the 3084th ADG to support the 99th Bomb Wing in their exercise on 25 Nov 57. This exercise, nickname "Buck Mouse", had a pre-determined "P" hour. ..................... (1 sentence redacted by DOE) .......................
The middle of December sew a burst of activity with an exercise supporting SAC starting the 16th and two days later AMC directed exercises "Hot Dice" and "Last Chance". Although SAC had prior notification of the exercise, SAC elected to use their no prior notice recall procedures. Stony Brook followed suit. At 0600 local time, sirens blew and telephone recall was effected. ..................... (3 lines redacted by DOE) ............................... The reject was returned to the plant and given a Final Assembly Test. This inspection and test failed to turn up any malfunction or other discrepancy so the unit was returned to stockpile in serviceable condition.
On the evening of 18 Dec 57 a message was received by the OD to execute AMC Operations Plan 119-57 "Last Chance". "P" hour was 19/0200Z (18/2100 local). ................... (1 sentence redacted by DOE) ................................... SAC was not involved. After the weapons had been delivered to the WCP, they were then returned to igloo storage. While "Last Chance" was in full swing another execution order was received. This was simulated "Hot Dice" and required only simulated movement of aircraft and weapons. Messages were sent to show these movements.
(1 Jan - 30 June 1958)
Operationally, the past six-month period was more active than the six-month period described in the Previous history. Forty-nine directed missions involving approximately 133 LSS and SSS aircraft were completed in this reporting period as compared to twenty-six in the Previous history. In addition, forty-eight LSS aircraft with no specific mission for this station were met by Movement Coordinators and were provided routine support under the supervision of the Operations and Plans Division. (Uncl)
The number of readiness exercises conducted with SAC was reduced during this period, and Command Post Exercises (CPXs) substituted. War Reserve material was delivered during EWP training exercises as SAC exercised its prerogative of using dispersed weapons. ............. (2 lines redacted by DOE) .......
A peak of approximately 250 man hours was expended on this maintenance during the month of June.
Several new operations plans and orders were written and those in effect were brought up to date. Check lists for use in the Operations Center by the Operations Controllers, and a Movement Coordinator Folder were devised. The Operations and Plans Division accomplished the task of rewriting all station Special Weapons Operating Procedures into Station Regulations, Station Supplements and Office Instructions. (Uncl)
The heavy workload experienced in December 1957 (as described in the previous history) continued throughout January with considerable expenditure of overtime. January also began the increased activity of this station in supporting Logistical Support Squadron aircraft, staging through Westover AFB delivering to, and returning special weapons and components from, overseas destinations. All Air Materiel Command LSS aircraft arriving at Westover AFB were met by Movement Coordinators and support and services were provided to the aircrews as required. For simplicity of format, the activity of each month is listed in one paragraph; unclassified code names are shown in parenthesis following the mission directive number. ............ (3 lines redacted by DOE) ..........
Annex Alfa required eight LSS aircraft to stage through Westover AFB for overseas destinations. Commencing 10 January and ending 18 January, Mission Directive 58-6 ("Tip Top") was completed. This mission required shipment of ten drogue parachutes from this station by LSS aircraft to the United Kingdom; returning aircraft delivered two drogue parachutes to this station for later shipment to MAAMA. Mission Directive 58-15 ("Tip Top") required the shipment of eleven drogue parachutes by one LSS aircraft and was completed 18 January. Five LSS aircraft participated in AMC OPOrd 121-58 ("Hob Knob") from 20-25 January. These aircraft staged through Westover AFB delivering special weapons to overseas destinations. Two house trailers, designated for our recreation area at Otis Lake, Mass. were off-loaded from two aircraft under Mission Directive 2-13 ("Ring Set") 29 January. Personnel from our Handling Division off-loaded the aircraft. ..................... (4 lines redacted by DOE) ....................................
Although this was a "no-notice" type exercise, it was expected by this station because the 99th Bomb Wing (SAC) had published an Operations Order setting up the period 1 Dec 57 - 31 March 58 for implementation on the "no-notice" basis. 3084th Aviation Depot Group Operations Order 300-57 had been published after receipt of the 99th Bomb Wing Operations Order, setting up specific procedures to be followed by this station during this operation. The Operations Center was activated immediately following notification and no personnel recall plan had to be effected due to implementation during duty hours. Messages required by Chapter II, AMC Manual 82-1, were submitted and all deliveries were made as scheduled by AMC Operations Plan 8-59. A six inch snow fall added many problems and snow removal equipment was required around the clock. The runways at Westover Force Base were closed for approximately forty-eight hours delaying aircraft take-offs but all aircraft were flown as soon as the runways were opened. Despite the cold weather, heavy snows and related problems, no accidents or personnel injuries occurred during this operation. This maneuver was considered a success by Westover Air Force Base and this station. The experience gained during this cold weather delivery was considered extremely valuable.
At 0200 local time, 12 January, a SAC Training Exercise under SAC OPlan 10-588 was effected with no prior notice to this station. The first information relayed to this station by Westover AFB personnel was insufficient to determine the extent this organization would be involved. The Officer of the Day on duty notified the Special Weapons Operations Officer who made the decision to recall the 4-hour shift. The 99th Bomb Wing Command Post subsequently notified our Operations Center that no weapon deliveries would be required but requested we be available. Local procedures were completed up to, but not including, breakout of weapons. The SAC exercise was terminated approximately four and one-half hours after initial implementation.
On 15 January a "Hickory Tree" test of classified release procedures was passed from CINCNORAD through the reporting channels to this station. All action by this station was completed satisfactorily
The 3084th Aviation Depot Group OPOrd 100-58 was published to prepare for the Annual Wing Inspector General Inspection which began 27 January. On 28 January this station participated in a "Last Chance" (3084th ADG OPlan 118-58) exercise as a part of this inspection. A simulated station evacuation (3084th ADG OPlan 1-58) was initiated by AMC while the "Last Chance" was in progress. Preparations were made to evacuate to the Alternate Operations Center and the evacuation was simulated. The exercise was terminated by the Chief Inspector. (Reference portion of this History prepared by Group Inspector) (Uncl)
During February, the frequency of aircraft and operational activities decreased; staff officers and plant personnel were busy preparing and revising procedures as recommended by the Wing Inspection Team. From 3-6 February, AMC OP Ord 122-58 ("Stay Up") required four LSS aircraft to pass through Westover AFB enroute to overseas destinations. Crew support services were furnished. Mission Directive 58-31 required one LSS aircraft to airlift one MK 36 trainer from Kelly AFB, Texas to Westover AFB end return a MK 21 trainer, 7 Feb. We also participated in Mission Directive 58-55 on 25 and 26 Feb involving one LSS aircraft on a SAC support mission.
Headquarters 8th Air Force requested a temporary loan of one MK 39 MOD 0 trainer for use by the 24th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC) from 3 to 8 February. This request was later changed to MK 15 MOD 0 trainer, and delivery was completed by Handling Division personnel of this squadron.
A "No Notice" SAC exercise "Team Play" - AMC "Test Hop" was called by Westover AFB at 0730 hours, 12 February, requiring delivery of our EWP schedule. During the course of this exercise we received a "Boxwood" test message. This message was immediately relayed by telephone to the resident representative. The entire "No Notice" exercise was considered a success and was terminated at 2030 hours, 13 February.
The remainder of February was spent in routine administrative and maintenance work. (Uncl)
On 13 March one LSS aircraft on Mission Directive 58-72 transported communications equipment (the old station switchboard) from Stony Brook AFS to Kelly AFB, Texas. We participated in two missions on 22 March; Mission Directive 58-90 requiring routine support on one aircraft, and Mission Directive 58-95 requiring one LSS aircraft to transport a MK 7 trainer to Kelly AFB, Texas.
An AMC directed "Last Chance" CPX Training Exercise was conducted 25 March 1958. "P" hour was 1400 Z. Assembly and delivery of EWP weapons, in accordance with AMC OPlan 8-58, was simulated and reports required by AMCM 82-1 were submitted.
After many delays and postponements, project "Rabbit Tracks" was completed at 0220Z, 31 March 1958. (Uncl)
On 8 April, "Cocked Pistol" was received from the 99th Bomb Wing Command Post. The Site Manager was notified at 0222Z, certificates and transfer of the stockpile simulated at 0302Z.
On 10 April, this station participated in Mission Directive 58-107 which involved one LSS aircraft, and 58-127 which involved two LSS aircraft. Air crews were fed and quartered at Stony Brook AFS. The two aircraft on Mission Directive 58-127 completed the final portion of their mission on 23 April, which required them to return cargo to this station. April continued to be a busy month for aircraft movement as we participated in the following mission directives involving one LSS aircraft each - 58-131, 12 April; 58-134, 15 April; and 58-153, 23 April. Mission Directive 58-143, another "Soap Box" mission, was conducted 17-18 April. ........................ (1 sentence redacted by DOE) ....................................... On 21 April, one aircraft operating under Mission Directive 58-151, off-loaded 1200 pounds of unclassified supplies for the 24th ADS (SAC) and this station. Special Weapons Supply personnel off-loaded the aircraft and completed the mission. On 25 April we began participating in a mission that lasted until 23 May which involved twelve aircraft a total of twenty trips through Westover AFB. This mission was Annex Alfa to AMC OPOrd 123-58 ("Pony Boy") and Annex Golf-2 to ANC OPOrd 112-57 ("Nite Cap"). Although Stony Brook did not receive cargo from these missions, crew support services were furnished. Mission Directive 58-158 required one LSS aircraft to pick up 13 MC-595 parachutes at Stony Brook AFS, 25 Apr 58, for shipment overseas and the return of 2 MC-595 parachutes to this station, 4 May 58. From 29 April to 29 May this station participated in AMC OPOrd 112-57 and SAC OPOrd 37-57 ("Cash Box"). ........................ (3 lines redacted by DOE) .............................. It was originally scheduled to be completed 21 May but was delayed one week due to some weapons not being available for shipment as scheduled. Extensive inter-base coordination was required and excellent cooperation was received from Westover AFB personnel.
"Cash Box" units received from the DOD field bases were inspected by Stony Brook AFS Quality Control Inspectors and numerous discrepancies were noted. The shortages required a large number of priority requisitions. After the requisitions were submitted, we were directed by Wing Headquarters to forward a report of discrepancies for their information.
On 6 May, 1630Z, we received a message from 3079th Aviation Depot Wing placing us in a simulated Readiness Condition Two for "Opal 53". This exercise was in support of Wing and AMC OPOrd 60-58 which involved only the "Attack Phase" during this reporting Period. From Readiness Condition Two we went into a simulated "Last Chance" training exercise with a "P" hour of 1600Z and simulated the assembly and delivery of EWP weapon quantities in accordance with AMC OPlan 8-58. At 1832Z, we received a notice to simulate "Alert for Evacuation". At 1945Z, "Evacuate Phase One" was effected as outlined in AMC OPlan 1-58. The "All Clear" was received at 2212Z and "Opal 58" was terminated for the calendar day of 6 May 58 at 0237Z, 7 May 58. ........................ (3.5 lines redacted by DOE) ............................ A locally directed execution of 3084th Aviation Depot Group OPlan 1-58 was conducted concurrently. "Alert for "Evacuation" was ordered at 1926Z. This locally directed exercise was considered realistic and successful. Termination of "Attack Phase" of "Opal 58-2" was received 07/2159Z. The entire exercise was completed without interruption. The exercise was a success and much important information derived from it; however, the simulated OPlan 2-58 proved to have little value other than as a test of communications procedures. ................. (5 lines redacted by DOE) .....................................
On 13 May we furnished routine support to one LSS aircraft which staged through Westover AFB on Mission Directive 58-173. On 16 May one aircraft on Mission Directive 58-175 came in to pick up cargo from the 24th ADS. .......................... (3.5 lines redacted by DOE) ....................... Mission Directive 58-185 was the shipment on 20 June of one capsule to Stony Brook AFS by "Cow Poke" aircraft. On 30 May we supplied routine support to one LSS aircraft passing through Westover AFB on Mission Directive 58-188.
An exercise of the 3084th Aviation Depot Group Disaster Control Plan was conducted 10 May. The exercise consisted of a simulated Air Defense Yellow followed by a simulated Air Defense Red and simulated detonation of a 20 KT weapon in the vicinity of the station complex, resulting in a number of simulated casualties and fallout. Other actions included penetration of the "Q" Area by (simulated) aggressor forces at three locations and the destruction of all classified documents during final stages of the problem. The exercise was considered a success in that many areas were noted that could be improved upon.
June was the busiest month of this reporting period for support of LSS aircraft. Activities began on 5 June with Mission Directive 58-201 requiring one aircraft to transport parachutes from Stony Brook AFS to overseas destinations with a return shipment of parachutes to this station on the 14th. Mission Directive 58-205 required one LSS aircraft to transport a Ross Straddle Carrier to Westover AFB for the 24th ADS on 6 June 1958. Two LSS aircraft were scheduled to pass through Westover AFB on Mission Directive 58-209 for routine support, however, they were diverted to Kindly AFB. These two aircraft returned cargo to Stony Brook AFS, 12 June. Routine support was provided to one LSS aircraft on Mission 58-219 which passed through Westover AFB for overseas on 13 June and one LSS aircraft on Mission Directive 58-215 returning from overseas on 19 June. Twenty-one MC-595 parachutes were shipped overseas on Mission Directive 58-226 19 Jun 58. Three M-19 shapes were returned to the 24th ADS, 22 June, on this same mission. (Uncl)
Annex Oscar 2 to AMC OPOrd 112-57 ("Coon Dog") required us to provide routine support to seven aircraft that made eleven trips through Westover AFB exchanging weapons between overseas bases and DOD bases in the ZI. This mission was amended to provide one aircraft pickup of two "Big Tail" (parachutes) at Stony Brook AFS for overseas shipment. This mission began 21 June and continued through the reporting period. On 22 June, one LSS aircraft brought twenty four MK 2 MOD 0 parachutes to Stony Brook AFS from Ellsworth AFB on Mission Directive 58-230. These parachutes were to be transhipped on a later mission. Mission Directive 58-236 involved one aircraft, delivering one MK 36 trainer to Stony Brook AFS, 26 June 1958, and returning one MK 21 trainer to Kelly AFB, 27 June. ........................... (3 lines redacted by DOE) ................................................ This was the fourth mission of this type during the reporting period. The aircraft arrived at Westover AFB 26 June and the mission was completed 28 June, one day ahead of schedule. The last LSS mission for the reporting period involved one aircraft on Mission Directive 58-240 picking up unclassified cargo at this station, 28 June 1958. (Conf FRD)
As described in the previous History, the problems encountered during this period were negligible, although parking for "Hot Cargo" aircraft has, on occasion, been severely limited. The cooperation received from 814th Air Base Group, 24th ADS and the LSS air crews has been excellent. Our Movement Coordinators have worked many off-duty hours in this additional duty. We believe the Movement Coordinators reduced aircraft ground time to an absolute minimum and that they are needed and appreciated by LSS air crew members. (Uncl)
The Squadron Unit Fund Council as of 1 January 1958 consisted of the following members:
Capt Gregory E. Loucks
Capt Basil L. Boatright
TSgt Louis J. Gonzales
TSgt Roy W. Green
TSgt Frank O. Hunter
TSgt Ralph E. Luvin
TSgt Karl F. Davis
SSgt Ralph G. Robicheau
A/1C Daniel H. Hilt
The net worth at that time was approximately $250.00.
Approximately three hundred ($300) dollars of the unit fund was expended during the period January - June 1958 for magazines, trophies, area beautification equipment, coffee urns and cups, and softball jerseys. A new council consisting of the following persons was effected 1 May 58.
Capt Dwight L. Atkinson
Capt Howard B. Schmidt
TSgt Frank O. Hunter
TSgt Ralph E. Luvin
TSgt Roy W. Green
TSgt Karl F. Davis
A/1C Leighton W. Nickerson
A/1C Daniel H. Hilt
The unit fund balance at the end of June was $350.00
Ed. Note: From this point, the 3084th Aviation Depot Group Semiannual Historical Reports were reduced to a summary AMC Form 268 (Sep 58) and a few brief comments, etc. This resulted in a reduction in content, details, and useful historical information. It is my opinion that this change was directed from higher headquarters in order to reduce the amount of time and effort dedicated to the composition and preparation of these reports. From an historical perspective, it is regrettable. These summarized reports are available as PDF files, and are located at the end of the 3084th Aviation Depot Group Mission and Command link.